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The Model Employment Termination Act: Fairness for Employees
and Employers Alike
By Theodore J. St. Antoine
Professor St. Antoine is with the University
of Michigan Law School in Ann Arbor.

The Model Employment Termination
Act (META), 1 which state legislatures are
expected to consider in the near future
aims to prevent the unfair firing of Amer~
ican workers. At the same time, the Act
aims to prevent devastating financial
blows to American business. For both em-

ployees and employers, META offers
streamlined dispute resolution procedures
that would be simpler, less costly, and less
time-consuming than the civil courts. The
essence of the proposal is compromise-not as a matter of political expediency
but as a practical, balanced accommodation of the competing worthwhile interests
of employers and employees. Workers are
entitled to be free from arbitrary treatment; business is entitled to be free from

1
9A Labor Relations Reporter (Washington, DC: Bureau
of National Affairs) IERM 540:21(December1991).
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unnecessary expense. META would promote both objectives.
META was approved and recommended for enactment in all the states by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at its annual
meeting in August 1991. By states, the
final vote showed 39 jurisdictions in favor
of the measure and only 11 opposed.2
That alone attests to META's merits. The
Uniform Law Commissioners (ULC) are a
cross-section of influential lawyers, judges,
law teachers1 and legislators from around
the country, with an average of about six
persons in each state delegation. Bills are
prepared by committees that meet two or
three times a year for intensive 2-day
drafting sessions. Bills are not adopted by
the ULC unless they have been read lineby-line at least twice during different annual conferences. More controversial measures, like META, may take three or more
readings.
The META drafting committee consisted of eleven members, with myself as
"reporter" or principal draftsperson. Traditionally, drafting committees are composed of generalists, with specialized
expertise being supplied by the reporter
and o~tside adv~sors. The META drafting
committee received highly useful assistance from representatives of the American Bar Association's Labor and
Employment Law Section, the AFL-CIO
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, th~
ACLU, the National Employment Lawyers Association, and numerous other
groups and individuals.
Unjust dismissal is a significant practical problem. Jack Stieber, former director
2

Ibid.

Stieber, "Recent Developments in Employment-atWill," 36 Labor L. ]., 557, 558 (1985).
4 Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 519-20
(1884).
.
. 5 See B. Bluestone and B. Harrison, The Deindustrializatwn of America, 63-06 (1982); and L. Ferman and J.
Gordus, The Economy and Mental Health (1979).
6 9A Labor Relations Reporter (Washington, DC: BNA)
IERM 505:41 (February 1992); H. Perritt, Employee Dismissal Law and Practice (2d ed. 1987).
3
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of the School of Labor and Industrial Relations at Michigan State University, estimates that "[s]ome 60 million U.S.
employees are subject to the employmentat-will doctrine and about 5 million of
them are discharged each year." 3 He further calculates that around 150,000 of
these workers are discharged unfairly
under the standards applicable in unionized industries. Until recently, the great
mass of American working people had no
recourse. Employers could dismiss their
employees "at will ... for good cause, for
no cause, or even for a cause morally
wrong." 4 The economic deprivation of the
wrongfully discharged worker is only part
of the story. Numerous studies document
the increases in cardiovascular deaths
suicides, mental breakdowns, alcoholism:
spouse and child abuse, and impaired social relations that follow in the wake of
job loss.5
During the past couple of decades, the
courts in 40-45 jurisdictions have employed three main theories to carve out
certain exceptions to the previously prevailing doctrine of employment-at-will.6
Those three theories include tort violations of public policy, or "abusive" or
"retaliatory" discharge; 7 breach of an express or implied contract, embodied in a
personnel manual or an oral assurance at
the time of hiring;8 and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.9
For both employers and employees, however, there are serious deficiencies in these
common law doctrines. They constitute a
weak reed, a fragile safeguard for the
worker who has been wronged. And yet in
a given case they can wreak havoc on a
hapless employer who runs afoul of them.
7 Petermann v. Teamsters Local 3%, 174 Cal. App. 2d
184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), 38 LC~ 65,861; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980).
8

Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 4a!

Mich. 579, 292 NW 2d 880 (1980); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill
Inc., 57 NY 2d 458, 443 NE 2d 441 (1982), 99 LC~ 55,401.•
9 Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96
364 N.E. 2d 1251 (1977).
'
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The tort or public policy claim will be
limited by its nature to rare, egregious
situations. How many employers, especially if they have the benefit of knowledgeable counsel, are going to order their
employees to commit perjury or engage in
an illegal price-fixing scheme, and then
fire them if they refuse? To avoid a contract obligation, all an employer has to do
is refrain from making any commitments
about future job security. Even if an employer has made such a commitment
through a policy statement in an employee handbook, most states permit a
unilateral revocation as long as there is
adequate notice to the affected workers. 10
The covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, which is potentially the most expansive protection for employees, has
been accepted by a dozen states at most.
Conceptually, as New York's highest
court has observed, the extension of the
covenant to cover wrongful discharge
would not be so much an exception to atwill employment, as a negation of the
whole doctrine. 11 Most courts are not going to be so activist as to take that step.
Finally, the great majority of successful
plaintiffs are professionals or upper-level
management personnel. Rank-and-file
workers who are fired usually have too
little money at stake to make their cases
worthwhile for lawyers operating on a
contingent fee basis.
On the other hand, for an employer
that does get ensnared in a common law
wrongful discharge action, the results can
be extremely costly. Various studies of
California lawsuits found that a plaintiff
who could get to the jury won over 75
10

In re Certified Question (Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting

432 Mich. 438, 443 NW 2d 112 (1989), 112 LC
~ 56,091. Cf. Enis v. Continental Ill. Nat'/ Bank & Trust
Co., 795 F2d 39, 41(CA-71986), 40 EPD ~ 36,295.
11 Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 58 NY2d 293,
304-05, 448 NE2d 86, 91 (1983).
12 Palefsky, "Wrongful Termination Litigation: Dagwood
and Goliath," 62 Mich. B.J. 776 (1983); "Discharge Verdicts
Average $424,527 in California," 9 Labor Relations Reporter, 1 Employment Rights (Washington, DC: BNA), No.
Co.),
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percent of the time and the average verdict ranged between $300,000 and
$450,000.1 2 Throughout the country, single individuals have received jury awards
covering compensatory and punitive damages as high as $20 million, $4.7 million,
$3.25 million, $2.57 million, $2 million,
$1.5 million, $1.19 million, and $1 million.13 Company attorneys in Chicago,
Cleveland, and Detroit tell me that even
the successful defense of a discharge case
before a jury will cost between $100,000
and $150,000, while their counterparts on
the coasts say that figure can reach
$200,000. In addition, a recent RAND
study indicates that the "hidden costs"
incurred by American business in trying
to avoid this onerous litigation, including
the retention of undesirable employees,
may amount to one hundred times more
than the adverse judgments and other legal expenses. 14
In sum, the central defects of the existing common law system are that employees' substantive rights are too limited
and uncertain, the remedies against employers are too random and often excessive, and the decisionmaking process is too
inefficient for all concerned. META attempts to address each of these problems.
It guarantees the vast majority of workers
certain irreducible minimum rights
against wrongful discharge, but substantially reduces the potential liability of employers. It also substitutes the use of
professional arbitrators in place of long,
expensive court proceedings as the preferred method of enforcement. That can
also mean the elimination of wayward
verdicts by emotionally aroused juries.
14, at 3 (March 3, 1987); and J. Dertouzos, E. Holland and
P. Ebener, The Legal and Economic Consequences of
Wrongful Termination 24-26, 33-37 (1988).
13 K. Lopatka and J. Martin, "Developments in the Law
of Wrongful Discharge," in ABA National Institute on Litigating Wrongful Discharge and Invasion of Privacy Claims

vii, 13-18 (1986).
14 J. Dertouzos and L. Karoly,
to Employer Liability (1991 ).
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"Good Cause" Termination
For employees covered by META, the
termination of employment would be prohibited unless there was "good cause." 15
Good cause could consist of either misconduct or poor performance on an individual
worker's part, or the economic needs and
goals of the enterprise as determined by
the employer in the good-faith exercise of
business judgment. The term "good
cause" was chosen instead of the more
common "just cause," which appears in
collective bargaining agreements, in order
to emphasize the economic flexibility accorded the employer, even though no difference in meaning was intended.
Interpreters of the statute are directed for
guidance to the arbitral precedent developed over the past half century, so the
broad language has already been applied
and given substance in thousands of decisions.
Examples of good cause for termination
in an individual case include theft, assault, destruction of property, drug or alcohol use on the job, insubordination,
excessive absenteeism, incompetence, and
poor performance. An objective standard
exists here, with the finder of fact making
the ultimate determination. Economic decisions are primarily subjective, however,
with good faith the only limitation on the
employer's business judgment. Management is entirely free to determine the
nature and direction of the enterprise, the
size of the work force, the location of
plants, and all other similar matters.
About the only restriction is that an employer could not concoct a sham layoff to
rid itself of an employee as to whom there
was no good cause for a termination, since
that would violate the good-faith requirement.
ts Model Employment Termination Act (META)§§ 1(4),
J(a).
16 Id.,

§ § 1(1), J(b).

Employers are also entitled to set performance standards for positions in their
establishments. Standards may be fixed at
the loftiest level management desires, as
long as they are not skewed to disadvantage particular individuals. In highly
competitive occupations, such as professional sports or legal practice, a performance standard could call for the most
proficient performer available for a given
position.
META would cover most full-time employees (those working 20 or more hours a
week) after one year of service with an
employer. 16 An exception exists for small
employers, or those employers with fewer
than five employees. 17 Small establishments may engage in some of the most
arbitrary treatment of workers, but it was
still felt unwise to interfere with these
mom-and-pop operations. Initially it was
proposed to exclude high-level, policymaking executives, but management advisors objected. A trade-off for protection
under the Act is the elimination of common law tort and implied contract actions
based on prohibited terminations, and of
course it is well-paid corporate officials
who are the most likely to have the biggest claims. Workers subject to collective
bargaining agreements are covered to the
extent permitted by federal preemption
law.18 The inclusion of public employees is
left to state option.

Displacing Common Law Suits
As indicated, a major trade-off in
META is the displacement or extinguishment of most common law suits based on
terminations forbidden under the Act.
These suits would include implied contract claims and tort claims grounded in
such theories as defamation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and other
similar theories. 19 There would be no exf 10,478A; and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
471 US SCt 724 (1985), 102 LC f 55,497.
t9

v. Massachusetts,

META§ 2(c) and (e).

Id., § 1(2).
18 Federal preemption is unlikely. See Lingle v. Norge
Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 US SCt 399 (1988), la! LC
17
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tinguishment of rights or claims under
express contracts or under statutes or administrative regulations, such as those
dealing with job . discrimination,
"whistleblowing," and occupational safety
and health.
Remedies would be confined to those
customary under the federal Civil Rights
Act of 1964; namely, reinstatement with
or without backpay and attorney's fees for
a prevailing party. 20 Severance pay is allowable when reinstatement is impracticable, up to a maximum of 36 months'
pay in the most egregious cases. Compensatory and punitive damages are expressly excluded.21
The preferred method for enforcing
META is through professional arbitrators
appointed by an appropriate state
agency. 22 Such persons have the requisite
skill, training, and experience to understand the special problems of the workplace, and they will thus probably be
more acceptable to employers and employees. Their efficiency in resolving industrial disputes is also likely to reduce
the time and expense of the proceedings.
One departure from arbitral practice in
the unionize9 sector is that the burden of
proof under META rests on a complainant employee. 23 That accords with the
usual rule in the civil courts, but since the
employer generally knows best why it terminated the employee, the employer must
ordinarily proceed first to present its case.
Arbitral awards would be subject only to
limited judicial review, primarily on the
grounds of corruption, an exceeding of authority, or a prejudicial error of law.24
Who should bear the costs of these proposed procedures? As a matter of principle, the new public right to be free from
unjust dismissal, like any other public
right, ought to be enforced at public expense. But most states are financially
20

Id.,
Id.,
22 Id.,
23 Id.,
21

§ 7(b).
§ 7(d).
§6.
§ 6(e).

IRRA Spring Meeting

strapped these days, and the prospect of
an additional and ill-defined fiscal burden
could be the last straw for a measure that
is bound to generate controversy. Recognizing this, META suggests that as an
alternative to the normal filing fee the
states consider imposing a substantial
part of the cost on the parties themselves,
perhaps with a cap on the employee's
share in an amount equal to one or two
weeks' pre-termination pay.25
Among the most hotly debated aspects
of META are provisions allowing employers and employees to waive or "opt out"
of the prescribed statutory rights and procedures. Thus, by express written agreement, the parties may eliminate the good
cause protections and substitute a
mandatory severance payment of at least
one month's pay for each year of employment,26 or the parties may agree on a
private arbitration procedure to resolve
their dispute.27
Now, "freedom of contract" is a prized
American prerogative, but the waiver of
statutory rights in the employment context is traditionally suspect. There is such
disparity of bargaining power that workers applying for a job will commonly sign
any form an employer places in front of
them. There are theories available by
which the courts can minimize the risks
her~conomic duress, contracts of adhesion, and so on. Furthermore, the fairly
generous severance pay schedule and
other technical features of that provision
may largely confine its application to
higher-ranking managerial personnel. The
courts should also demand that any private arbitration system must meet stringent due process requirements before it
may replace the statutory procedures.

Conclusion
Adoption of META's "good cause"
standard would not put this country at a
24

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
27 Id.,
25
26

§ 8(c).
§ S(e) and Comment.
§ 4(c) (30 months' pay is maximum required).
§ 4(i).
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competitive disadvantage in today's
global market. The contrary seems to be
more true. The United States is the last
major industrial democracy in the world
that has not heeded the call of the International Labor Organization for generalized legal protections against the
wrongful dismissal of employees. 28 More-

500

over, there is considerable evidence that a
secure, contented work force makes for
high productivity and quality output. 29
In this instance, doing the right thing
may also be doing the smart thing.
[The End]
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